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Actuality and Intelligibility
Hegel and Peirce on Experience Vis-à-Vis Reason
Vincent Colapietro
“The capital error of Hegel which permeates his
whole system in every part of it is that he almost
altogether ignores the Outward Clash.” (8.41)1
“The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to
the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which
however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that
the third category […] suffices to make the world,
or is even so much as self-sufficient.” (“What
Pragmatism Is” in The Monist [1905])2
 
1. Introduction
1 My aim is to compare two thinkers for the purpose of illuminating a topic both judged to
be pivotal.3 That topic is the relationship between experience and reason. In the first
main section after this Introduction, I will consider how Hegel no less than Peirce takes
philosophy to be the offspring of experience, thereby showing how Hegel’s apparently
overweening rationalism4 is  intimately tied to an unabashed empiricism.  In the next
section, I will consider how close Hegel’s appreciation of doubt is to Peirce’s, contrasting
their  understanding  with  Descartes’s.  In  the  third  and  final  section,  save  for  the
Conclusion, I will highlight the commitment of these two thinkers to intelligibility. As
fundamental as the appeal to experience is in each of their projects, their commitment to
the intelligibility of nature, history, and humanity is no less fundamental. While in the
Conclusion  I  will draw  together  my  main  conclusions  and  underscore  several  open
questions,  my task in this  Introduction is  threefold.  I  want to highlight  the obstacles
confronting anyone who desires to draw Hegel and Peirce together as closely as I am
disposed to do, the philosophical and not just the historical importance of doing so, and
finally the order in which I intend to treat this topic.5 I have already outlined this order,
Actuality and Intelligibility
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
1
so what remains to be done in the Introduction concerns the obstacles facing us and the
importance of our topic. 
2 At the outset of any comparison between G. W. F. Hegel and C. S. Peirce, various questions
forcefully, almost violently, intrude themselves, not least of all two interpretive questions.6
To what extent did Peirce actually break with a priori modes of inquiry (cf. Short 2007)?7
To what extent is it accurate to take Hegel’s logic to be an a priori articulation of what any
instance of saying, whatever counts as an intelligible utterance, minimally entails (cf.
Bowman 2015)? 
3 These hermeneutic questions immediately invite philosophical ones. What indeed does
saying  anything  about  anything  minimally  entail?  For  Hegel,  who  bears  patient,
painstaking witness in the Logic to the dialectical process, the answer is: nothing less than
the categories as they unfold themselves in this monumental work. These categories are
not subjective forms imposed upon a subject matter: they are rather immanent, if only
implicit, in the Sache itself. For Peirce, the answer to this question demands nothing less
than  the  categories  of  firstness,  secondness,  and  thirdness  (see,  e.g.,  6.323-24)  and
especially the recursive function of these distinct categories (see Savan 1987-88, Chapter
II; also, Esposito 1980, Chapter VI, especially 179-94).8 Closely allied to these questions,
there is another philosophical question: to what extent is it possible, in philosophy, to
avoid a priori inquiry and to rely on a thoroughly experiential approach. if indeed it is at
all possible? 
4 Peirce’s philosophical genius no less than Hegel’s is bound up with his lifelong endeavor
to  articulate  a  categoreal  scheme  adequate  to  the  multitudinous  forms  of  human
experience.  In both cases,  the derivation of  the categories seems,  at  once,  intimately
connected to the contingencies of experiential compulsion and the necessities of purely
formal rationality. Experience deprived of the power to overthrow the regnant forms of
human cognition is only nominally experience. Reason incapable of plumbing the depths
of  experience  is,  likewise,  only  nominally  reason.  The  name  experience properly
designates only what has the force to topple the seemingly most unassailable edifices of
human  thought,  just  as  the  word  reason designates  what  possesses  the  capacity  to
anticipate the course of experience, but also to revise itself in light of the frustration of
those anticipations.9 As much as thought is always an instance of reverie, it is at the same
time an instance of working through the impasses and defeats to which it is brought by its
own definitive demands. For neither Hegel nor Peirce is reason given at the outset, except
in the most inchoate, implicit form. It is more than anything else an achievement and, as
such, it emerges from experience, our confrontation with actuality. Philosophy, as an
exemplification  of  rationality,  one  in  which  a  relentless  drive  toward  reflexive
understanding  (in  a  word,  self-understanding)  is  a  defining  feature  of  this  rational
endeavor, provides a dramatic instance of reason springing from the womb of experience.
Peirce’s  guiding question,  “How [do] things  grow”? (7.267n8l;  see also,  EP 2:  373-4),  is
manifestly also Hegel’s. The salience of this question is, for these philosophers, equally
pressing  for  understanding  the  cosmos  and human reason as  it  undergoes  dramatic
transmutations in the course of striving to define its historical functions. Indeed, Hegel
no less than Peirce evinces an appreciation of the role of experience in inaugurating,
sustaining, and driving the growth of rationality. As paradoxical as this must sound to
many readers, such growth is, at the same time, “a self-development of thought” (Peirce,
4.10).10 
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2. Philosophy as the Offspring of Experience
5 In the judgment of  both his  immediate successors and,  a  generation or so later,  the
classical  pragmatists,  the  dialectic  of  experience  and  reason  did  not  culminate  in
Immanuel Kant’s monumental achievement. As insightful and suggestive as his critical
philosophy has proven to be, from his time to ours, an altogether adequate account in
which  the  demands  of  reason  and  the  disclosures  of  experience  are  harmoniously
integrated cannot be found in Kant’s writings. From Fichte to Peirce and beyond, up to
the present, critics of Kant have alleged unresolved tensions and fundamental occlusions
in his ingenious endeavor to grant both experience and reason their due. In his writings,
the a priori reason of the rationalists and the a posteriori facts of the empiricists were
candidly acknowledged but not intimately allied. Moreover, the forms of thought were,
by  implication,  static,  inert,  and  external  (see,  e.g.,  Sedgewick  2010).  His  theoretical
reconciliation falls  short of  doing adequate justice to the dynamic integration in our
historical  endeavors  such  as  experimental  science,  political  governance,  and  artistic
creation of experiential compulsion and rational necessity or, at least, exigency.11 Finally,
Kant’s  categories,  at  least  in  the judgment  of  such critics  as  Hegel  and Peirce,  were
invincibly subjective, rather than at once forms of thought and forms of being. As they
appear in Kant’s system, they were, in effect, given apart from the actual history in which
they assumed determinate shape (Sedgewick). The very consideration of their historicity
was precluded by the constraints within which Kant was struggling to think through the
question  of  the  categories.  As  such,  the  forms  of  intelligibility  were  themselves
unintelligible. Self-legislative reason, self-thinking thought, emerged from a matrix in
which reason discovers itself to be, time and again, a heteronomous agent acting in behalf
of an unacknowledged, or unsuspected, power, in which thinking comes to the realization
that its  autonomy is  an achievement,  and an invincibly precarious achievement.  The
autonomy of  reason is  rooted  in  a  confrontation  with  otherness.  This  confrontation
results in reason becoming other than it  has been, becoming to some extent its own
other.  On  Hegel’s  account  and  Peirce’s,  heteronomy is  not  so  much the  opposite  of
autonomy as a condition for the attainment and refinement of whatever degree of self-
governance a rational animal can obtain.
6 Even if  it  turns out that  the a priori mode of  inquiry cannot be avoided,  the role of
experience is  hardly negligible or,  in a sense,  even secondary.  Does not Hegel  insist,
“experience is the real author of growth and advance in philosophy” (1975: §12, p. 18)?
There is unquestionably a sense in which primacy appears to be granted to experience
when he claims, “philosophy is the child of experience, and owes its rise to a posteriori
fact. As a matter of fact, thinking is always the negation of what we have immediately
before us” (ibid.: §12, p. 17). Such claims obviously accord an importance to experience.
One way of reading Hegel’s Logic, then, is to say that it presupposes nothing but “what we
have immediately before us” at some chance moment (whatever this might be). In this
instance, however, the a priori would seem to presuppose the a posteriori. Robert Stern
supports this reading when he asserts: “[T]he only grounds for the sort of investigation
carried out by the Logic into thought (which must therefore [thereafter?] be carried out
presuppositionally insofar as thought is  its  object)  is  exactly the kind of  ‘real  doubt’
championed by the pragmatists at the expense of the ‘artificial doubt’ associated with
Cartesianism” (Stern, 2011: 570). In fact, Hegel is emphatic about this: as Stern explains,
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“it is [from Hegel’s perspective] only when consciousness has been brought to a state of
genuine despair [i.e., radical doubt] that it will be ready for the Logic, a despair the ‘shilly-
shallying’  doubt  of  Descartes  can never  achieve  […]”  (ibid.).12 Textually,  Hegel’s  Logic
presupposes his Phenomenology of Spirit. Methodologically and substantively, the work of
elaborating a system of categories begins with the collapse of thought, a doubt so radical
as  to  warrant  being  described  as  despair.  The  negativity  constitutive  of  thought  is
however boundless and productive. It ceaselessly drives toward its own negation. In the
process of negation, the shapes of consciousness or the forms of experience are negated
but  not  utterly  annihilated.  They  are  inevitably  preserved.  In  Hegel’s  Logic,  thought
commences,  ever again:  the resurrection of thinking assumes a history of thought in
which thinking has suffered defeat at its own hands.13 I will return to this crucial point in
the next section.
7 On this account, the a priori is paradoxically posterior to the a posteriori. Pure thought is,
of course, thought and, in turn, thought only emerges out of experience, above all, the
experience of error. This is true for Hegel no less than Peirce.14 Thought as such emerges
only  out  of  a  long,  intricate  history  of  countless,  fundamental  errors  (errors  so
fundamental that their rejection thrusts us into nothing less than a different world than
the one in which we were so much at home).15 The burden of exhibiting that history is the
task of Hegel’s, though not Peirce’s, phenomenology. There is, accordingly, a sense in
which  Hegel’s  Logic presupposes  his  Phenomenology and  that  sense  encompasses  the
tangled history of error as a presupposition of a hyperformal science of logic (Zambrana
2015), i.e., the presuppositionless science of logic.
8 Thought as it emerges from this history is one thing; thought as it is in itself, namely apart
from this  history  and all  else,  is  another.  In  Peircean terms,  thought  as  historically
emergent is an instance of thirdness, while thought as it is, in itself, is a case of firstness.
Thought, in the form of inquiry, emerges when beliefs break down and doubt seizes us.
That is, the experience of error signals the birth of thought in this sense (Peirce, CP 7.345).
What also complicates this account of thought as thirdness is, of course, that thought in
itself  is  an instance of  the firstness  of  thirdness,  the qualitatively  felt  immediacy of
mediation. With Hegel’s Phenomenology, we begin with thought (to use the language of
Peirce’s categories) in its Secondness and, with his Logic, we move toward thought in its
Firstness; then, in the culminating parts of his philosophical system (Naturphilosophie and
Geistphilosophie), we move toward thought in its increasing Thirdness.16 In its culmination,
we arrive at what Peirce would call the thirdness of thirdness (CP 5.121; also in EP 2: 197).
“Reasonable  reasonableness  is  Thirdness  as  Thirdness”  (EP  2:  197),  but  such
reasonableness is concrete.17 In processural terms, concreteness is to be understood (to
borrow  a  term  from  Whitehead,  but  for  a  purpose  not  altogether  his)  in  terms  of
concrescence,  the  process  of  growing  ever  more  concrete,  just  as  actuality  is  to  be
conceived as actualization. The German word Wirklichkeit no less than the English one
actuality at least hint at a link with activity. The actual has the capacity to exert itself on
what is  other than itself. It  in effect  works on the densely sedimented results  of  an
ongoing historical process. It unsettles sedimented patterns of thought and forms of life,
opening paths to novel modes of thinking and of living. Forms of life no less than patterns
of thought implode,  since they prove in the course of history,  under the pressure of
experience, inadequate to both their defining aspirations and the actual conditions in
which human striving alone amounts to anything significant and substantive. For our
purpose,  thinking  is  a  process  in  which  its  failures  generate  the  possibility  of  its
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resurrection from the ashes of self-immolation. The history of reason, be it in the form of
Hegel’s dialectical notion of Vernunft or Peirce’s experimental conception of intelligence,
is to a great extent a history of failure, frustration, and indeed humiliation.
9 Neither was a skeptic in the sense that he denied the very possibility of knowledge (far
from it), but both were appreciative of what might be called the experience of skepticism,
reason’s recurrent collapses and ensuing struggles to reclaim and revivify itself. That is,
both are resolutely anti-skeptical  philosophers who nonetheless take the disorienting
experience of radical doubt with the utmost seriousness. While such doubt is far from
what Descartes tried to produce by his adherence to a method of treating the dubious as
though it were false, it is in a certain respect more radical than such methodic or make-
believe doubt.  Hegelian and Peircean doubt are rooted in a critical  awareness of  the
epochal upheavals of historically generated doubts. These epochal upheavals provide the
experiential matrices out of which rational thought, in its endeavor to secure an effective
autonomy, endeavors to re-establish itself. Thinking always presupposes the experience
of  thinking and,  thus,  the experience of  doubt  in a  radical  sense,  the sense in which
agential disorientation is so profound that at the time of its dramatic appearance human
rationality cannot be certain of a successful recovery.
 
3. Cartesian, Hegelian, and Peircean Doubt:
Skepticism as Experience
10 The experience of error is truly an experience, that which we live through. Moreover, it
profoundly alters the actual shape of human consciousness in the most concrete sense
(experience as Erlebnis and Erfahrung).18 It might even be identified as what skepticism
practically (or experientially) means. We are thrown into radical doubt, into seemingly
invincible despair. So understood, skepticism is not a thesis we put forth or a stance we
take, but an experience we live through. For all of their unbounded confidence in our
cognitive capacities, both Hegel and Peirce are deeply appreciative of the significance of
skepticism in this experiential sense. There is an important sense in which they have a
deeper appreciation of such radical doubt than does the celebrated champion of methodic
skepticism (see, e.g., Peirce, CP 6.498).
11 Of course, students of Peirce will be quick to point out that he was not a skeptic. And, in
the textbook sense, he of course was not. Virtually all of these students however tend to
draw an all too sharp distinction between his fallibilism and skepticism. They are far from
wrong  in  taking  pains  to  distinguish  Peirce’s  fallibilism  from  virtually  all  forms  of
skepticism. In doing so, they are simply following Peirce’s emphatic rejection of universal
doubt as a methodical principle. But something tends to get lost. Peirce’s attitude toward
skepticism is possibly more nuanced than even his some of his most insightful expositors
appreciate  (e.g.,  Haack 1983;  Hookway 1992;  Potter  1985;  and Short  2007).  Given the
relevance of our experience of doubt to the argument being presented here, it is crucial
to highlight several of the ways in which his attitude is nuanced. Especially in reference
to self-understanding, the tendency to set fallibilism and skepticism in stark opposition
obfuscates what needs to be clarified – above all, how the experience of radical doubt
plays a role in the constitution of reflexive comprehension. 
12 In certain respects, to repeat, Peirce’s fallibilism is closer to skepticism than even his
most astute expositors appear to appreciate. It is unquestionably imperative to keep in
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mind  his  claim,  “there  is  a  world  of  difference  between  fallible  knowledge  and  no
knowledge” (1.37). It is equally important to take seriously his assertion, “if we have no
immediate  perception  of  a  non-ego,  [then]  we  can  have  no  reason  to  admit  the
supposition of an existence so contrary to all experience as that would in that case be”
(ibid.).  Put  otherwise  (and  less  misleadingly),  “we  have  direct  experience  of  things  in
themselves” (6.95). Against modern rationalists and modern empiricists, against Locke no
less than Descartes, hence, he asserts: “Nothing can be more completely false than that
we experience only our own ideas” (ibid.).19 We directly (or “immediately”) experience
reality. Any idea of what is absolutely other than what we experience or conceive would
be  beyond  our  power  of  conjecturing,  were  “absolute”  or  irreducible  otherness  not
integral to our experience. We can imagine ourselves capable of framing an intelligible
conception of unknowable things in themselves only because we have had the experience
of reality rending asunder our most deeply entrenched convictions and beliefs. As it turns
out, however, we are mistaken in this. What we imagine ourselves able to do cannot in
principle be done, since it entails a contradiction. There is, indeed, a world of difference
between imagining ourselves capable of framing such a conception and truly being able to
frame  one.  Kant  was  convinced  that  we  have  the  capacity  to  frame  an  intelligible
conception  of  unknowable  things  in  themselves,  indeed,  that  there  is  no  inherent
obstacle to framing such a conception.  Peirce was equally convinced that there is an
inherent  and  hence  invincible  obstacle  to  doing  so.  As  logicians,  transcendental  or
otherwise, they profoundly disagreed about what is logically possible. As a result, they, as
philosophers, equally disagreed about what is cognitively accessible to the human mind.
13 “There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing,” Peirce insists, “outward things as they
really are and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases” (5.311).
But we can never be absolutely certain that we possess such knowledge in any specific
case. Reversing what I take to be the Kantian presumption, Peirce is arguing that second-
order  knowledge  is  less  secure  and  less  certain  than  first-order  knowledge.  This  is
important  for  my  argument.  Descartes  and  Kant  take  first-order  knowledge  to  be
dependent on second-order knowledge, whereas Peirce does not. 
14 Peirce does not hesitate to give radical doubt his utmost (if qualified) respect. After all, he
writes, “scepticism about the reality of things, – provided it be genuine and sincere, and not a
sham, – is a healthy and growing state of mental development” (8.43; emphasis added).
Such skepticism is not a doctrine to be refuted, once and for all; it is rather an experience
to be countenanced, time and again (cf. Alasdair MacIntyre 2006a). The formal refutation
of a doctrine is one thing, the experiential defeat of our certainty quite another. As a
doctrine, skepticism is, for those animated by the passionate desire to discover what they
do not know, of little or no interest (cf. Ransdell 2000; also, Potter 1985). As an experience
about the reality of things, however, genuine skepticism is an ineliminable part of human
inquiry. No less than Hegel and MacIntyre, Peirce appreciated this. For finite, fallible, and
arguably fallen20 beings such as we are, the pursuit of knowledge cannot but be a journey
of despair, though one in which the Phoenix of hope arises from the ashes of its self-
immolation. 
15 At,  or at  least  near,  the center of  Peirce’s  vision,  then,  there is  a recognition of  our
experience of our ignorance and errors. Nothing is, in my judgment, more central to his
philosophy than his valorization of this experience. This is evident in his insistence: “The
experience of  ignorance,  or of  error,  which we have,  and which we gain by means of
correcting our errors, or enlarging our knowledge [i.e., diminishing our ignorance], does
Actuality and Intelligibility
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
6
enable  us  to  experience  and  conceive  something  which  is  independent  […]”  (7.345;
emphasis added).21 We have an experience of that which is independent of our finite
minds (including any actual historical community) and, on the basis of this experience,
we  form a  conception of  reality  as  that  which is  independent  of  such thought  (not
thought in general, but thought insofar as it is finite). What is independent of finite mind
is  not independent  of  infinite  mind.  It  is  indeed relative to mind in the sense of  an
unbounded  capacity  able  to  transform  itself  into  an  ever  more  adequate  means  of
grasping the actual disclosures of our evolving experience. Mind as given (or inherited) is
however never fully adequate to reality as given in experience. In turn, reality as given in
experience is itself never passively given. It actively elicits the creative activity of an
evolving intelligence. 
16 Peirce could not have had a stronger ally than Hegel in accrediting the experience, while
rejecting  the  doctrine,  of  skepticism.  At  the  center  of  their  projections,22 there  is  an
unblinking acknowledgment of the devastating power of radical doubt. The utter defeat
of a definitive stance or determinate shape of human consciousness (e.g., Sense Certainty;
or Stoicism, Skepticism, or Unhappy Consciousness) results from the inadequacy of that
stance in the face of determinate phenomena, that is, of compulsive experience23 (what
Peirce was inclined to call the Outward Clash). Such a shape indeed implodes, from its
own inherent inadequacy, but it does so as a result of what, in the course of experience, it
must  but  cannot  acknowledge.  But  what  results  is  a  determinate  negation and,  as  a
consequence of this, a more adequate understanding is attained. This positive aspect of
immanent  critique needs  to  be  appreciated no less  than its  destructive  facet.24 Such
adequacy is predominantly a retrospective judgment; in contrast, the abiding sense that
even our greatest cognitive achievements are corrigible moments in an ongoing process
points to the prospective character of experimental inquiry as an historical practice (i.e.,
an evolved and evolving endeavor).
17 For  both  thinkers,  then,  thought  emerges  in  response  to  what  is  encountered  in
experience and what is so encountered is not to be located in consciousness (or the self),
not even in the dialogue between self and other, but in the process wherein alterity and
reflexivity, (more simply) other and self emerge and evolve in an open-ended manner. So,
Peirce, referring to Hegel’s Logic, desires, as Hegel does, readers who are not “impressed
by the more tangible, wooden, and dead ideas, – or corpses of ideas, – rather than by the
more elusive,  fluid,  and living ones” (7.642).  “Remembering […]  that  philosophy is  a
science based upon everyday experience,  we must,” Peirce advises,  “not fall  into the
absurdity of setting down as a datum and starting-point of philosophy any abstract and
simple idea, as Hegel did when he began his logic with pure Being” (8.112; Review of
Royce’s The World & the Individual, c. 1900). In philosophy, our point of departure ought to
be not specifically an abstract and simple idea (say, the idea of Being, i.e., pure being), but
virtually any concrete and complex one. This criticism of Hegel is however immediately
followed by an endorsement: “we must set out from ideas familiar and complex, as Hegel
began his greater masterpiece by considering a man sitting under a tree in a garden in the
afternoon” (ibid.,  emphasis added). We must begin with finite minds entangled in the
actual  circumstances of  their  precarious lives,  though the quiet  moment of  a  person
sitting safely in pastoral seclusion is admittedly one in which the precarious character of
human life is hardly prominent. “We must not begin by talking of pure ideas, – vagabond
thoughts that tramp the public roads without any human habitation, – but [we] must begin
with men and their conversations” (1.112; emphasis added). Philosophical inquiry grows out
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of commonplace experience and, as it turns out, the experience of utterance (hence, the
phenomenon of articulation) is especially salient to the work of the philosopher. “We are
familiar with the phenomenon of a man’s expressing an opinion, sometimes decidedly,
often otherwise. Perhaps it will be a mere suggestion, a mere question” (ibid.). Not the a
priori idea of pure Being, but rather the inescapably familiar phenomenon of expression,
constitutes the beginning of philosophical thought deliberately striving to assume radical
responsibility for its own fateful development. In Peirce’s judgment, then, Hegel’s logic,
as the discipline in which the long list of the most fundamental categories are displayed
in their dialectical necessity, actually begins with the experientially familiar phenomenon
of expression, in any of its modes (even that of “a mere question,” perhaps especially that
of an urgently felt interrogative).25 “We learn by experience,” as Hegel himself so tellingly
observes in the Preface to PhG (A. V. Miller translation), “that we meant something other
than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to go
back to the proposition, and understand it in some other way” (1977: 39).26 
18 The meaning of being is inseparable from the being of meaning, that is, from the being of
signs,  as they are concretely embodied in (say) human expression, hence as they are
inadequately present in any actual instance. This is what I am inclined to call Peirce’s
master ontological argument, though it rarely is cast in the form of an argumentation. It
is  however  frequently  encountered  in  his  writings  as  an  “argument”  (thus,  as  an
enthymeme in which the form of the argument is more or less unstated). One iteration of
this argument is this argument runs as follows:
The mode of being of the composition of thought […] is the living intelligence which
is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as knowledge of such reality. It is the
entelechy, or perfection of being. (6.341)
So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, in itself,
unattached to any subject, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of
rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute action
upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to rationalize it would
be to destroy its  being;27 and thirdly,  there is  living intelligence from which all
reality  and all  power are derived,  which is  rational  necessity  and necessitation.
(6.342; emphasis added)
19 If Secondness is taken completely by itself, hence utterly apart from Thirdness, it would
be entirely stripped of what Hegel calls the ideality of finitude (see Lesser Logic). And this
would result  in rendering things,  finite  things in their  brute interactions,  ultimately
unintelligible. But Peirce is no less an advocate of intelligibility than Hegel. Does he not
equate being with cognizability?
20 In an intriguing passage, Peirce compares his speculative rhetoric to Hegel’s objective
logic (see Fisch 1986; Kent 1977). The point of the comparison appears to be that, in both
cases, the finite thinker is not arranging distinct categories in an intelligible sequence but
rather such a thinker is tracing out the movement of thought itself as thoughts unfold
themselves according to an immanent logic. Note first, however, that for Peirce the third
and culminating branch of logic is “the highest and most living branch” (2.333), the one
wherein if anyone is unduly impressed by
[…] the more tangible, wooden, and dead ideas, – or corpses of ideas, – rather than
by the more elusive, fluid, and living ones, my principal care will be to correct such
notions. (7.642)
21 Much like Hegel, then, fluid and living ideas, not static and dead ones, are the focus of
Peirce’s concern. “With Speculative Rhetoric, Logic, in the sense of Normative Semeiotic,
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is,” Peirce claims, “brought to a close” (2.111). But the discipline with which Peirce’s logic
culminates  is,  in  his  judgment,  apparently  akin  to  that  with  which  Hegel’s  system
commences, as he makes immediately clear.
But now we have to examine whether there be a doctrine of signs corresponding to
Hegel’s objective logic; that is to say, whether there be a life in Signs, so that – the
requisite  vehicle  being  present  –  they  will  go  through  a  certain  order  of
development, and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that
the same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be
the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive order, there
be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished with a vehicle of life goes
through, and what is the nature of it. There are minds who will pooh-pooh an idea
of this sort, much as they would pooh-pooh a theory involving fairies. I have no
objection to the pooh-pooh-ing of fairies, provided it be critical pooh-pooh-ing; but
I wish I had the leisure to place before those gentlemen a work to be entitled The
History of Pooh-pooh-ing. I think it would do them good; and make room in their
minds for an essay upon the Logic of Pooh-pooh-ing. (2.111)
22 The claims of both thinkers have been pooh-poohed, but they have a way of winning,
time and again, the critical attention of responsible philosophers, so their facile dismissal
seems to be an intellectual injustice. When competent inquirers genuinely disagree, real
doubt is present. 
 
4. An Unabashed Commitment to Unbounded
Intelligibility
23 Hegel identifies philosophy with idealism in one fundamental sense of this ambiguous
term.  In this  sense,  idealism is  not  one among other approaches to philosophy.  It  is
philosophy. Accordingly, to abandon the principle of idealism involves nothing less than
destroying philosophy itself.28 While the empiricist might be content to take the actual
world to be at bottom a brute fact, simply to be accepted in its opacity, the idealist in its
most  basic  Hegelian  sense  cannot  do  so.  For  finite  minds,  there  may  be  absolutely
inexplicable facts but the universe (or totality of things) is to some extent a cosmos and,
in turn, this cosmos is not itself such a brute or inexplicable fact. It is intelligible and, as it
turns out, it is intelligible because it is self-luminous. In all of its defining facets (e.g.,
nature and the life of “mind” or Geist) reality renders itself intelligible by its own inherent
drive toward ever more adequate articulation of what it actually is (and what it actually
is,  because  actually means  finitely,  must  be  seen  as  what  it  inadequately  is).29 Finite
actuality (cf. Miller; Colapietro 2003) is unintelligible apart from infinite ideality. This is
as much (if not more) an ontological claim as it is an epistemological one. On this account,
finite  actuality,  often taken to be the most  concrete  form of  reality,  is  ontologically
deficient. It is indeed an impoverished mode of being, because it is an utterly dependent
mode. That which is self-dependent and that which is self-explanatory are one and the
same. Finite actuality depends on what is other than itself: its actuality is inseparably tied
to its finitude and the finitude of anything is the result of that thing being determined by
the limits imposed on it by other finite beings.  Finite actuality is,  thus,  definition by
others. Beyond this, it depends on an infinite network of irreducible otherness. To make
sense out of any concrete instance of finite actuality (e.g., a species of animals or a form
of governance), we need to situate it in a context, that is, a network of relationships in
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which what the thing is can only be ascertained by reference to what is other than that
thing (say, in the case of a species of animals, the environment and other species).
24 On at least some occasions, the cosmos certainly confronts us as that which transcends
our understanding, yet contains countless and seductive intimations of intelligibility. It is
often felt to be our home, a habitat in which our being, including our being here, is not an
anomaly). This is central to Hegel and Peirce’s vision. But being exiled from one habitat
after another is no less central to their account of our relationship to the world.30
25 Hegel was in some respects quite unfair to any number of his predecessors, not least of all
Kant, while Peirce was in important respects unjust to some of his predecessors, above all
Hegel.31 Hegel hardly ignored the Outward Clash. Of greater importance, he (as it were)
attended with greater care than did Peirce himself to the complex relationship between
Secondness and Thirdness as defining features of the Outward Clash.32 More fully, Hegel
attended  with  more  painstaking  care  than  Peirce  to  both  genuine  and  degenerate
Secondness as well as to the three forms of Thirdness (the two degenerate modes and the
genuine  one).  While  a  degenerate  form  of  Secondness,  the  clash of  one  categoreal
framework with another is hardly an unimportant or negligible phenomenon. The clash
exemplified  by  the  familiar  phenomena  in  which  truly  genuine  Secondness  is
predominant  is  indeed  one  in  which  the  secondness  exhibits  its  force  and  brutality
against the backdrop of Thirdness.  Take one of Peirce’s favorite examples of genuine
Secondness (one is struck violently in the back of the head as one is walking down a
street). The physical blow is, in this illustration, tied to its utter unexpectedness and, of
course, expectation is an instance of Thirdness. There is, to be sure, the physical blow in
its purely brute force (a paradigm of genuine Secondness). But the example betrays how,
in our experience, Secondness is tied to Thirdness, how rupture is linked to continuity.
We and, indeed “all  things […] swim in continua” (Peirce,  CP 1.171),  including in the
objective continua of space and time (or that of space-time). The unconscious expectation
of moving safely through the world is shattered in the experience of unanticipated pain.
26 The  completely  unexpected  frustration  of  a  largely  unconscious  intention  is  a
phenomenon in  which the  Secondness  is  experienced as  startling  and disconcerting,
precisely because we had no inkling of anything about to oppose our exertions. While this
is true in all contexts of our endeavors, it is dramatically evident in social and political
contexts. Also in the history of science, anomalies arise and, in the course of that history,
they  often  gather  strength  and salience,  so  much so  that  they  eventually  prompt  a
revision, perhaps a radical revision, of the regnant framework of scientific explanation
(cf. Kuhn 2012). The experiential clash of this framework with this or that aspect of the
world, as this or that aspect so forcefully asserts itself in experience, tends to generate an
agon between rival frameworks (e.g., the Ptolemaic and the Copernican or the Newtonian
and the Einsteinian). And, in the history of such conflicts, more adequate frameworks
emerge, ones incorporating the insights of their rivals while avoiding the limitations and
distortions of these alterative schemes. Though I am far from confident that this is the
case,  the clash of one framework with another might be taken as an instance of the
Secondness of Thirdness (however degenerate an instance of such Secondness). In turn, the
overcoming of this opposition might be taken as the Thirdness of Thirdness. (The almost
wholly implicit  but deeply felt  sense of intelligibility by which we move through the
world might, finally, be taken as the Firstness of Thirdness.)
27 Of course, there is great danger and indeed inevitable distortions whenever we translate
one thinker  into the categories  of  another.  But,  as  a  result  of  our  attempts  at  such
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translation, there can also be insight and illumination. Just as something inevitably is lost
in translation, other things might be gained. Accordingly, I formally propose to do what I
have actually been doing just now – translating facets of Hegel’s project into Peirce’s
categories.
28 What,  then,  is  my  provisional  conclusion?  Far  from being  a  just  criticism of  Hegel,
Peirce’s repeated charge that his predecessor overlooked the Outward Clash borders on
philosophical slander. After all, does not Hegel insist, the Absolute “contains within itself
the highest degree of opposition” (SL 824; WL 6: 548; quoted by Zambrana 2010: 212)?33 A
careful reader of Hegel’s often obscure writings can only conclude that nothing is more
central to his philosophical project than inescapable, irreducible conflict, operating at
various levels (including the experiential level of direct conflict between consciousness
and what it  encounters) and assuming distinct guises.  The question of whether these
conflicts  are truly irreducible is,  however,  a fair and important one.  There is,  in my
judgment a warrant, for taking Hegel to be close to Peirce on this point.
29 In  sum,  Hegel  did  not ignore  the  Outward  Clash  between  the  finite  mind  and  the
experiential world in which the concrete actualization of any finite mind takes place.
Much like Peirce, he situated this clash in a broader context in order to render it more
fully intelligible.  He carefully attended to the various aspects of irreducible,  but (in a
sense) not invincible opposition (or Secondness).  What Peirce would call  actuality,  in
itself,  is  not only unintelligible but also anti-intelligible.  Actual  things and events,  as
familiar,  complex phenomena of  universal  human experience,  are,  however,  not pure
seconds:  they  are  shot  through  with  Thirdness.  This  implies  that  these  objects  and
occurrences are bound up with ideality,  infinity,  and history (history is  the scene in
which the Thirdness of Thirdness might yet triumph, in a more adequate and hence less
violent form than anything yet realized).
30 What unites  Hegel  and Peirce is,  above all  else,  a  robust  commitment to unbounded
intelligibility. Inseparably connected to this,  their kinship is  nowhere deeper than in
their subtle, nuanced, painstaking accounts of the complex interplay among immediacy,
opposition,  and  mediation.  For  our  purpose,  at  least  on  this  occasion,  the  interplay
between opposition and mediation needs to be thrust into the foreground. For the most
part, we must let Firstness go unexplored, while attending to Secondness and Thirdness
in their interplay. Peirce was brilliant in bringing certain facets of this interplay into
sharpest  focus.  But  Hegel  was,  at  least,  equally  brilliant  in  exhibiting  not  only  the
centrality of fateful  conflict but also just how the conflict of  rival  frameworks is the
driving force of human history. What is however easy to miss is that these frameworks
are inseparable from the worlds in which they emerge.  The medieval  outlook is,  for
example,  one  with  the  medieval world.  It  makes  sense  only  in that  world,  though
ultimately it cannot make sense of that world and, as a result, it drives toward its own
transcendence. But this is because, given its defining contradictions, that world drives
toward its  own dissolution.  It  becomes far more intelligible after its  dissolution than
during its duration. 
31 But Hegel no less than Peirce is a midwife, assisting the birth of a world struggling to
emerge from the womb of history. The dramatic birth of such a world is always a novel
bid for intelligibility. It is an attempt to make wider, deeper sense out of the world than
has ever yet been achieved. It involves summing up the past, for the purposes of the
present, and inaugurating the present, for the possibility of a future beyond anything yet
imagined. There is no better example of the Thirdness of Thirdness than the birth of a
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world in which the self-luminosity of the world manifests itself to rational agents, hence a
world in which the artistic, philosophical, and religiousness consciousness of such agents
actualizes itself in the evolved and indeed evolving forms of concrete reasonableness (e.g.,
artworks,  modes  of  worship,  and  forms  of  explanation).  Concrete  reasonableness  is
concrete by virtue of being embodied and it is embodied, first and foremost, in the habits
and artifacts of rational agents in the actual circumstances of their historical time (CP
6.476).
32 Philosophy  is  an  attempt  to  come  to  adequate  terms  with  the  actual  world  in  its
irreducibly concreteness,  to comprehend as fully and finely as possible the concrete,
infinite totality in which finite, fallible minds are rooted (hence, the totality out of which
such minds not only grow in their inherited forms but also evolve toward ever novel
ones).  No appeal  to immediacy can instantly secure concreteness;  no such appeal  or
sequence of  such appeals  can do much,  if  anything,  to  render  thought  concrete.  An
intricate process of reflexive mediation alone can render philosophy concrete. Hegel’s
dialectical approach and Peirce’s pragmaticist orientation are thus allied in their shared
aspiration – to render reason concrete, more concrete than it has proven itself to be up to
this point. But this involves participating in historical processes and shared practices.
That  is  by standing apart  from the world we do not  render it  rational,  and thereby
intelligible; rather the world itself in its irrepressible tendencies and undying restlessness
renders itself rational and,  insofar as we participate thoughtfully in the processes and
practices by which this is accomplished, we render ourselves more concretely reasonable.
Of course, we can no more conceive ourselves apart from the world than we can conceive
the world apart from the possibility of beings who are in principle capable of knowing it.
Both  Hegel  and  Peirce  unabashedly  affirm the  objectivity  of  the  categories,  without
denying their status as integral features of cognitive agents.  The world renders itself
rational and intelligible through agents such as us, while we render ourselves human and
actual through an ongoing process of radical self-alteration. 
33 There is  no Thirdness  without  Secondness.  There is  in  principle  Secondness  without
Thirdness,  but  there  is  in  practice  hardly  a  trace  of  Secondness  utterly  apart  from
Thirdness.  One irony  is  that  Hegel  was  in  effect  endeavoring  to  grasp  not  pure
Secondness but Secondness in its complex relationships to Thirdness, the degenerate and
genuine forms of Secondness in conjunction with the degenerate forms of Thirdness but
above all the genuine form (i.e., the Thirdness of Thirdness). He appreciated not only the
outward clash between self and other but also the various levels and forms of agon in and
through which older forms of intelligibility implode and, out of the ruins, newer forms
are assembled. So, far from ignoring Secondness, Hegel makes it central to his project, at
least as central as Peirce makes it to his. “And this notion, of being such as other things
make them, is,” Peirce suggests, “such a prominent feature of our life that we conceive
other things also to exist by virtue of their reactions against each other. The idea of
other, of not, becomes a very pivot of thought” (1.324; cf. Bowman 2015). It is a notion
around which arguably everything turns. The actual determinations resulting from such
finite actuality (finite beings acquiring differential form in their drive to crowd out a
place for themselves in the actual world) must be a central part of any adequate story of
the enveloping universe. But, by itself, it is, for Hegel and Peirce, inadequate. The ideality
of finitude, the infinity of ideality, and finally the actualization of ideality (insofar as this
is possible) in natural and historical processes need to be invoked in order to show how
the self-luminous intelligibility of a self-evolving universe is not a fanciful idea but at
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least a reasonable conjecture. Whether it is more than this, in particular, whether it is a
dialectical  necessity,  cannot be considered on this occasion.  Substantively,  Hegel  and
Peirce are making equally strong claims. Methodologically, however, Peirce is making a
much weaker one than Hegel. His claim about such intelligibility is avowedly nothing
more than a guess, albeit one for which rather strong arguments may be made. But, in the
end, it remains a guess. It is a might, rather than a must, be. Thus, the very point where
Hegel’s thought and Peirce’s so dramatically converge is the point where one of their
most fundamental differences comes into sharpest focus. Dialectical necessity stands in
marked contrast to heuristic possibility. But note that this difference is, for the most part,
not the one underscored by Peirce, though he did occasionally try to distinguish himself
from Hegel in terms of necessity. 
 
5. Conclusion
34 Let  me  conclude  as  I  began  –  with  several  questions.  To  what  extent  can  Peirce’s
conception  of  experimental  intelligence  be  made  compatible  with  Hegel’s  notion  of
dialectical reason?  Does  Hegel’s  understanding  of  dialectical  necessity  truly  stand
opposed to Peirce’s conception of what would take place (an outcome he does not hesitate
to describe as destined)? Is the kind of necessity on which Hegel insisted opposed to the
freedom that Peirce and indeed the other pragmatists, especially James, were so anxious
to safeguard?34 For the most part, the importance of a philosopher is, contra Peirce, not
what significant truth that individual has proven,35 but rather what questions they have
shown  to  be  pivotal.  The  very  importance  of  their  questions  however  can  only  be
ascertained by juxtaposing them with other questions in some respects overlapping while
in other respects divergent.  One of the most illuminating ways to do this is  to draw
subtle, suggestive, and systematic thinkers, who are above all defined by their questions,
into dialogue with one another. G. W. F. Hegel and C. S. Peirce lend themselves to being
juxtaposed in this manner.36 When we do so, the secondness of thirdness, the clash of
ideals of intelligibility, will result.
35 The clash between them is, however, not nearly as simple or straightforward as Peirce
imagined.  Above  it,  it  is  not  reducible  to  Hegel’s  “trifling”  failure  to  appreciate  the
Outward  Clash.  But,  then,  Peirce’s  pragmaticism  might  assist  Hegel’s  idealism  in
becoming a more truly living logic in which the ineliminable agon of rational ideals works
itself  out  in  the  minute  details  and  overarching  aspirations  of  human  history.  The
portrait of either Hegel’s vision of dialectic reason or Peirce’s conception of experimental
intelligence can only be drawn in explicit, detailed reference to the seemingly contingent
events of an ongoing history. We discover at the center of this history not only the often
violent clash of rival ideals but also the inevitable inadequacy of even the most powerful
forms of human conceptualization to do justice to the unanticipated demands of our
ineluctable experience.
36 The writings  of  G.  W.  F.  Hegel  and C.  S.  Peirce  are  sites  in  which such clashes  are
dramatically displayed and such inadequacies are tellingly revealed. Beyond this, they
provide  resources  for  understanding  the  drama  of  thought  rescuing  itself  from  the
darkness of despair. Finally, these writings throw us toward the future in a manner in
which our distance from, yet entanglement with, the past is a defining feature of the
dramatic  present.37 In  other  words,  these  two  philosophers  are  nothing  less  than
dramatists of reason’s self-renewals and self-revisions (cf. MacIntyre 2006a). Whatever
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differences  divide them (and these differences  are numerous and deep),  this  kinship
conjoins them. Peirce sensed this kinship38 even if he tended to place mistaken emphasis
on the most telling difference between himself and Hegel. The clash between them does
not so much concern the outward clash between experience and reason39 as that between
somewhat  different  visions  of  the  intricate  relationship  between  rational  ideals  and
experiential compulsion. Exploring the relationship between Hegel and Peirce can be an
invaluable  aid  in  illuminating  the  relationship  between  reason  and  experience.  My
modest hope is to have rendered in this essay a bold claim somewhat plausible. With each
of  these thinkers,  one is  thrown back anew on the most  fundamental  questions and
forced  to  think  over  them,  once  again.  The  question  of  the  relationship  between
experience and reason is one such question. The positions to which Hegel and Peirce were
driven by their unblinking confrontation with the dramatic disclosures of ineluctable
experience and also by their unabashed commitment to unbounded intelligibility provide
more than an optimal basis of philosophical comparison. They provide insights into the
matter at hand.40
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NOTES
1. “Dr. Royce and his school, I am well aware,” Peirce stresses, “consider inductive reasoning to
be radically vicious; so that we unhappily cannot carry them along with us. (They often deny this,
by  the  way,  and  say  they  rest  entirely  on  experience.  This  is  because  they  so  overlook  the
Outward Clash, that they do not know what experience is. They are like Roger Bacon, who after
stating in eloquent terms that all knowledge comes from experience, goes on to mention spiritual
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illumination from on high as one of the most valuable kinds of experiences.) But they will not
succeed in exploding the method of modern science […]” (8.43).
2. “My whole method will be found,” Peirce at one point declared, “to be in profound contrast
with that of Hegel; I reject his philosophy in toto. Nevertheless, I have a certain sympathy with it,
and fancy that if its author had only noticed a very few circumstances he would himself have
been led to revolutionize his system. One of these is the double division or dichotomy of the
second idea of the triad. He has usually overlooked external Secondness, altogether. In other
words, he has committed the trifling oversight of forgetting that there is a real world with real
actions and reactions. Rather a serious oversight that” (1.368).
3. “The most familiar instances of the mental process known as Comparison seem, at first sight,
to  consist,”  Josiah Royce (1968:  170)  observes,  “of  a  consciousness  of  certain familiar  dyadic
relations – relations of similarity and difference. Red contrasts with green; sound breaks in upon
silence; one sensory quality collides […] with another.” This however is deceiving. The Hegelian
Royce draws explicitly upon the pragmaticist Peirce to make his point: “Now Peirce’s view of the
nature of comparison depends upon noticing that, familiar as such observations of similarity and
dissimilarity may be, no one of them constitutes the whole of any complete act of comparison.
Comparison, in the fuller sense of the word, takes place when one asks or answers the question:
‘What constitutes the difference between A and B?’ ‘Wherein does A resemble B?’ ‘Wherein consists
their distinction?’” (Ibid.: 171). The basis or ground of the comparison (to use one of Royce’s own
examples)  between,  say,  Shakespeare  and  Dante  (ibid.:  176-7)  delimits  the  scope  of  the
comparison  and,  thereby,  enhances  the  possibility  of  the  juxtaposition  being  instructive  or
illuminating. It is noteworthy that, in this context, Royce goes on to claim: “Peirce’s theory of
comparison, and of the mediating idea or ‘third’ which interprets,  is,  historically speaking, a
theory not derived from Hegel, by whom at the time he wrote these early logical papers [“On a
New List  of  Categories”  and the cognition series  in  JSP],  Peirce  had been in  no notable  way
influenced” (ibid.: 185; cf. Fisch, 1986: 261). Royce makes bold to assert: “Peirce’s conception of
interpretation [or, even more broadly, semiosis, i.e., sign-activity] defines an extremely general
process, of which the Hegelian dialectical triadic process is a very special case” (ibid.: 185). This
essay is nothing less than an exemplification of the process to which the logician Peirce and the
dialectician Hegel sought to exhibit in its most abstract form and to illustrate in its concrete
instances. It is, for both Hegel and Peirce, a process in which the “idea of other, of not, becomes
the  very  pivot  of  thought”  (1.324).  Peirce  however  missed  the  extent  to  which  irreducible
otherness played, for Hegel no less than for himself, this pivotal role. Such, at least, is what I
want to show in this essay.
4. Cf. James (1977: 48-9).
5. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1951) writes: “In the present
treatise on the soul we find, first, an Introduction: in which the author does the three things that
should be done in any Introduction. For in writing an Introduction one has three objects in view:
first,  to  gain  the  reader’s  good  will;  secondly,  to  dispose  him  to  learn;  thirdly,  to  win  his
attention. The first object one achieves by showing the reader the value of the knowledge in
question; the second by explaining the plan and divisions of the treatise; the third by warning
him of its difficulties.”
6. Everything is  similar  to  everything else,  in  some respect.  Hence,  pointing out  similarities
between even very different thinkers does not involve great ingenuity or insight. What we might
call the pragmatics of comparison needs above all to be borne in mind: What is the purpose of
drawing any specific comparison? In order to honor the spirit of these two philosophers, our
purpose  ought  to  be  philosophical:  it  should  concern  some  important  methodological  or
substantive issue. I have tried to do just this in my efforts here to draw a comparison between
Hegel and Peirce, for my principal purpose is becoming clearer about the relationship between
experience and reason. My secondary one is becoming clearer about the relationship between
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Hegel  and  Peirce.  In  philosophically  dealing  with  philosophers,  hermeneutic  and  historical
questions must ultimately be subordinated to strictly philosophical ones.
7. While  I  take  Peirce  to  be  a  radical  experimentalist,  there  are  passages  in  his  writings,
especially  pertaining  to  his  derivation  of  categories,  that  seem  to  be  instances  of  a  priori
reasoning.  For  the  most  part,  these  texts  however  can  be  rendered  consistent  with  his
experimentalism and, hence, are not what they seem (evidence of recourse to a priori reasoning.
Even so, they give the appearance that he was guilty of what he condemned in others.
8. Joseph Esposito rightfully points to the importance of Peirce’s “The Logic of Mathematics: An
Attempt to Develop My Categories from Within” (Esposito, 1980: 179ff.). It is significant that he
discusses  this  text  in  a  chapter  entitled  “Objective  Logic,”  thereby underscoring  the  affinity
between Peirce’s attempt to develop his categories in this manner and Hegel’s Logic.
9. In his Novum Organon, Francis Bacon (2000) highlights the way we anticipate experience and, in
his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant (1933) modifies this notion for his purpose.
10. “The highest symbol is,” Peirce insists, “one which signifies a growth, or self-development, of
thought, and it is of that alone that a moving representation is possible” (4.9; see 5.). He adds: “A
fallacy is,  for me, a supposititious thinking, a thinking that parades as a self-development of
thought but it is in fact begotten by some other sire than reason. […] For reasoning ceases to be
Reason  when  it  is  no  longer  reasonable:  thinking  ceases  to  be  Thought  when  true  thought
disowns  it. A  self-development  of  Thought  takes  the  course  that  thinking  will  take  that  is
sufficiently deliberate, and is not truly a self-development if it slips from being the thought of
one object-thought to being the thought of another object-thought. It is, in a geological sense, a
‘fault’ – and unconformability in the strata of thinking” (4.10). 
11. The demands and interests of reason need to be taken as seriously as the disclosures and
compulsions of experience.
12. It is certainly ironic that the “rationale for Hegel’s presuppositionless inquiry is thus one
with which the pragmatist can safely sympathize” (ibid.), since the sort of logic championed in
Hegel’s  Logic was  so  suspect  in  the  judgment  of  the  classical  pragmatists  and,  inseparably
connected to this, the philosophical ideal of a presuppositionless inquiry was no less dubious. But
what  softens  this  apparent  opposition  is  just  the  crucial  point  being  stressed  here:  Hegel’s
science of pure thought presupposes the experience of heuristic despair (or radical doubt).
13. “The hand that inflicts the wound is,” Hegel claims, “also the hand which heals it” (Lesser
Logic, 1975: 43).
14. Here, too, it is instructive to consult Stern’s “Hegel and Pragmatism.” 
15. It  is  ironic that James, even though he found Hegel’s overarching rationalism even more
unacceptable than did Peirce, appreciated the extent to which Hegel acknowledged – indeed,
highlighted – the centrality of what Peirce would call secondness, in conjunction with what Hegel
christens negation. “There is,” James himself emphasizes in A Pluralistic Universe, “a dialectical
movement in things,  if  such it  please you to call  it.”  What Hegelian or monistic  rationalism
highlights  is  also  what  pluralistic  empiricism highlights:  “everything  is  in  an  environment,”
there is “a surrounding world of other things, and […] if you leave it to work there [in that world]
it will inevitably meet with friction and opposition from its neighbors. Its rivals and enemies will
destroy it unless it can buy them off by compromising some part of its original pretensions”
(James, 1977: 45).
16. Quite apart from thought, this is often the sequence in which Peirce begins his presentation
of the categories. That is, he begins with secondness and then moves to firstness and, finally, to
thirdness.
17. This roughly – but only roughly – corresponds to Hegel’s much misunderstood notion of
Absolute Knowledge.
18. In  this  sense,  consciousness  is  not  anything invincibly inner,  private,  or  subjective.  It  is
embodied in institutions, practices, and discourses.
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19. An  interesting  question,  though  one  I  cannot  pursue  here,  is  how  Peirce’s  critique  of
Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism are related to Kant’s  “Refutation of  Idealism.”
There can be no question that his early engagement with Kant equipped him with motives and
resources to carry out this critique. But there is hardly any less question that he, perhaps quite
early  in  his  intellectual  life,  moved  beyond  Kant  and  toward  Hegel.  While  Kant’s  refutation
reinscribes the dualisms Hegel and Peirce were contesting, their own intensely critical approach
to Kant’s  “critical  philosophy” makes of  his  “Refutation of  Idealism” only a  waystation on a
journey landing them quite far from Königsberg.
20. “Most of us, such is the depravity of the human heart,” Peirce claims in one place, “look
askance at the notion that ideas have any [inherent] power; although some power they have we
cannot but admit” (2.149). In another place, he observes: “It is astonishing how human minds
seem naturally to pervert the interrelations of these three categories of fact. The triadic fact takes
place  in  thought.  I  do  not  say  in  anybody’s  thinking  [i.e.,  necessarily  in  any  finite  mind’s
cogitation],  but  in  pure  abstract  thought;  while  the  dyadic  thought  is  existential.  With  that
comparison plainly before them, our minds perversely regard the dyadic fact [or secondness] as
superior in reality to the ‘mere’ relation of thought which is the triadic fact [or thirdness]. We
forget  that  thinking  implies  existential  action  [i.e.,  that  thirdness  is  inseparable  from
secondness],  though it  does  not  consist  in  that  […]”  (6.324;  emphasis  added).  Such  passages
suggest to me that humans are not only finite and fallible but also (in a sense) “fallen.”
21. The  experience  of  error  and  ignorance  is  itself  gained  by  our  efforts  to  diminish  our
ignorance  or  correct  our  errors.  This  is  a  somewhat  subtle  point.  Experience  (at  least  our
experience  of  our  ignorance  and  errors)  is,  in  a  sense,  not  simply  had (cf.  John  Dewey  on
experience as had versus known). We come to have this experience as a result of our efforts to
counteract the disclosure, often quite painful, of these limitations and defects. Closer to Kant and
Hegel, more distant from Locke and Hume, Peirce stresses the active role of human agents in the
very constitution of even those experiences in which what is other than the self forces itself
brutally upon the self. To recall Hegel’s brilliant insight, the fear of truth, masquerading as the
fear of error, needs to be exposed for what it is. Peirce would pragmatically clarify the fear of
truth to be at bottom the fear of experience, specifically the power of experience to force us to
transform,  on  occasion  even  profoundly,  our  understanding  of,  and  our  relationship  to,  the
world.
22. In the chapter in A Pluralistic Universe devoted to Hegel, William James famously wrote: “Any
author is easy if you can catch the centre of his vision.” Specifically regarding Hegel, he proposes
a twofold vision. “The first part is,” James suggests,” “that reason is all-inclusive, the second was
that things are ‘dialectical’” (James, 1977: 164).
23. This expression is, of course, pleonastic, at least from Peirce’s perspective. Experience is by
its very nature compulsive.
24. For alerting me to my tendency to allow the destructive facet to eclipse the positive one, I am
indebted to Paul  Giladi.  Indeed,  he has offered many helpful  comments and suggestions,  too
many to explicitly acknowledge.
25. In “The Sentiment of Rationality” in The Will to Believe (1956), William James asserts: “The
germinal question concerning things brought for the first time before consciousness is not the
theoretic ‘What is that?’ but the practical ‘Who goes there?’ or rather […] ‘What is to be done’” (
ibid.: 84). My suggestion is that thought emerges first and foremost in the form of a question, not a
statement or imperative.
26. In Ballie’s translation, this is rendered: “The common view discovers that the statement is
intended in  another  sense  than it  is  thinking  of,  and this  correction of  its  opinion compels
knowledge to go back to the proposition and take it now in some other sense” (Hegel, 1967: 122).
Note, regardless of translation: we are compelled to revise the meaning and, in our effort to do
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so, we are compelled to go back to our original stance (“the proposition”) and modify it so that it
more adequately accords with what we mean, fully considered.
27. It is almost certainly the case that Peirce judges Hegel to have rationalized Secondness and,
hence, to have destroyed it. But he himself considers Secondness in conjunction with Thirdness,
underscoring the crucial role played by arbitrary force in the continuous growth of concrete
reasonableness.  Moreover,  he  insists,  “there  is  Thirdness  in  experience,  an  element  of
Reasonableness  to  which  we  can  train  our reason  to  conform  more  and  more”  ( EP 2:  212;
emphasis added). While human experience is a phenomenon in which brute compulsion is the
predominant  element,  immanent  reasonableness  is  also  characteristic  of  this  complex
phenomenon. Thus, it is far from clear wherein lies the difference between Peirce and Hegel
regarding  Secondness  in  its irreducibility.  Also,  Peirce’s  concluding  emphasis  on  “rational
necessity  and  necessitation,”  in  6.342,  make  it  hard  to  see  how  his  position  deviates
fundamentally from Hegel’s (the latter being accused of necessitarianism).
28. It  is  worth  recalling  in  full  a  passage  from  Hegel’s  Logic.  It  makes  clear  not  only  his
identification  of  philosophy  with  idealism  but also  that  an  embrace  of  finitude  (an
acknowledgment  of  actuality)  does  not  preclude  a  thoroughgoing  commitment  to  infinity,
properly understood. “The proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism
of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being.
Every philosophy is essentially an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle,  and the
question then is how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of
religion;  for  religion  equally  does  not  recognize  finitude  as  a  veritable  being,  as  something
ultimate  and  absolute  or  as  something  underived,  uncreated,  eternal.  Consequently,  the
opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed
veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the name of
philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms are
thoughts, universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that
is,  in  their  sensuous  individuality  –  not  even  the  water  of  Thales.  For  although this  is  also
empirical water, it is at the same time also the in-itself or essence of all other things, too, and
these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in themselves,  but are posited by, are
derived from, another, from water, that is, they are idealized” (Hegel, 2010: 154-5).
29. This argument is close to one put forth by Paul Giladi (2014).
30. The experimental inquirer “will live in quite a different world – quite a different aggregate of
experience – than unscientific world” (CP 1.236). The scientific revolution has ushered in nothing
less than the modern world or, more accurately, is one of the revolutions by which this world was
brought into being. 
31. But, especially in his maturity, Peirce became increasingly appreciative of Hegel’s genius and
accomplishments. One might say that his engagement with his predecessor points toward the
achievement of ambivalence (Segal 1992). If it began in a one-sided antipathy, it evolved into a
nuanced, qualified attraction and repulsion.
32. Peirce  no  less  than  Hegel  was  committed  to rescuing  universality  (or  generality)  from
abstractness; that is, he was in his way committed to the concrete universal. One text in which
this is evident is his reflections on art in the 19th century: After stressing how art, specifically
music,  in  this  century  has  valorized  objectivity,  he  quickly  notes:  “It  may  be  said  that  the
romanticism of our literature is a contrary tendency to replace the universal and abstract by the
personal and idiosyncratic. But such an objection is based on a comparison that has been cleared
up in the early years of the century by Hegel,  and which exact logic has rendered still  more
patent. Namely, the universal is not necessarily the abstracted. The abstractly universal is only
the lowest kind of universal. Whatever is true is universal in a better [or higher] sense, and the
personality  of  romantic  literature  is,  in  that  sense,  more  truly  universal  than  the  labels  of
classification” (Wiener (ed.) 1958: 264). The secondness of thirdness (embodied Thirds in process
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of development) encompasses what Hegel identified as concrete universals. This is more than
implicit in Peirce’s writings. There are passages, such as the one just quoted, wherein this point
is made quite explicitly.
33. Of  course,  Peirce or one of  his  champions might respond by suggesting that  what Hegel
means by opposition here is altogether different from what Peirce designates as Secondness. I
however am dubious that this is altogether accurate.
34. See  especially  John E.  Smith’s  (1987:  51-64).  It  is  possible,  even likely,  that  Peirce’s  self-
identification of his cosmology (“a Schelling-fashioned idealism” [CP 6.102]) is accurate. That is,
he is regarding the question of freedom closer to Schelling than Hegel. Even so, he did note how
his mature philosophy seemed to him to evolve in the direction of a position akin to Hegel’s (see,
e.g., Fisch, 1986: 276).
35. “When philosophy becomes an adult science, as it will before the twentieth century is half
over,  the first  question to be asked in weighing the importance of  any philosopher will  be,”
Peirce asserts, “what important truth did he prove, in the sense in which truths in philosophy can
be proved” (MS 470, 38; quoted by Fisch, 1986: 362). In my judgment, however, the first and likely
most important question to pose for this purpose is,  What fruitful questions did this or that
philosopher pose? Heuristic fecundity is more telling than putative proof.
36. Peirce in effect invites us to do just  this.  As Fisch notes in “Hegel and Peirce,” with the
practical experience of triangulation acquired from his work at the Coast Geodetic Survey, “it
was natural  for  him [Peirce]  to  locate his  own changing positions in relation to the nearest
eminent landmarks. And the most eminent of the nearest was Hegel” (Fisch, 1986: 279-89).
37. As  Alasdair  MacIntyre  (2006b:  85)  notes:  “the  self-knowledge of  a  self-conscious  rational
agent has always to be cast in a historical form. The past is present in the self in so many ways
and so  important  ways  that,  lacking historical  knowledge,  our  self-knowledge will  be  fatally
limited.”
38. The second epigram at the outset of this paper indicates just this.
39. I am not asserting that Peirce is simply wrong on this score, only that he exaggerates the
extent to which Hegel fails to see human experience as a majeure force capable of overthrowing
the putative necessities of absolute Reason. In Hegel’s account, experience is far more forceful
and central, reason far more fragile and precarious, than Peirce typically seems to appreciate. 
40. Richard  J.  Bernstein  in  “Why  Hegel  Now?”  (1986:  175)  wrote  of  Charles  Taylor:  “[He]
approaches  Hegel  not  primarily  as  a  self-effacing  commentator,  but  rather  as  a  philosopher
engaged in dialogue with another philosopher – seeking to show what we may learn from him in
our  attempts  to  understand  the  world.”  This  is  precisely  how  Peirce  also  engaged  Hegel’s
writings. The work of comparative philosophy ought, in my judgment, be that of facilitating a
philosophical dialogue, for the sake of learning from the exchange. If  it  fails to enhance our
understanding of the world, it is an idle exercise.
ABSTRACTS
Expressed in terms of his categories, Peirce criticized Hegel for having overlooked secondness,
“not mere twoness [or duality] but active oppugnancy” (CP 8.291; emphasis omitted), “the sense
of shock,” surprise, and especially struggle and conflict (CP 5.45). In particular, he judged his
predecessor harshly for having neglected or, at least, downplayed the role secondness, especially
in the form of experience, plays in the growth of knowledge. In Peirce’s judgment, then, Hegel’s
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emphasis  on  thirdness  (mediation,  conciliation,  integration,  and  the  overcoming  of
estrangement) tended to eclipse secondness (otherness,  opposition,  conflict,  clash,  and direct
encounters with irreducible otherness). If one considers what Hegel actually wrote about both
experience  vis-à-vis  reason  and,  more  generally,  the  role  of  conflict  in  the  generation  of
knowledge and indeed of much else, Peirce’s criticism hardly seems fair. My proximate purpose
is, however, not so much to defend Hegel’s thought against Peirce’s charge as to show how close
Hegel and Peirce are in their understanding of the relationship between experience and reason.
Beyond this,  my ultimate objective is  to illuminate this  relationship,  by consideration of  the
nuanced, subtle manner in which these thinkers construe this relationship. That is,  my main
purpose is not hermeneutic or historical but philosophical. Becoming clearer about how Peirce
stands to Hegel is not nearly as important as becoming clearer about how experience stands to
reason. As it turns out, however, a philological comparison facilitates our philosophical task.
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